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Abstract—Cognitive radio (CR) and non-orthogonal multiple
access (NOMA) have been deemed two promising technologies
due to their potential to achieve high spectral efficiency and
massive connectivity. This paper studies a multiple-input single-
output NOMA CR network relying on simultaneous wireless
information and power transfer (SWIPT) conceived for sup-
porting a massive population of power limited battery-driven
devices. In contrast to most of the existing works, which use an
ideally linear energy harvesting model, this study applies a more
practical non-linear energy harvesting model. In order to improve
the security of the primary network, an artificial-noise-aided
cooperative jamming scheme is proposed. The artificial-noise-
aided beamforming design problems are investigated subject to
the practical secrecy rate and energy harvesting constraints.
Specifically, the transmission power minimization problems are
formulated under both perfect channel state information (CSI)
and the bounded CSI error model. The problems formulated
are non-convex, hence they are challenging to solve. A pair of
algorithms either using semidefinite relaxation (SDR) or a cost
function are proposed for solving these problems. Our simulation
results show that the proposed cooperative jamming scheme
succeeds in establishing secure communications and NOMA is
capable of outperforming the conventional orthogonal multiple
access in terms of its power efficiency. Finally, we demonstrate
that the cost function algorithm outperforms the SDR-based
algorithm.
Index Terms—Cognitive radio, non-orthogonal multiple access,
non-linear energy harvesting, physical-layer secrecy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
THE next generation wireless communication systems callfor advanced communication techniques that can achieve
high spectral efficiency (SE) and provide massive connectiv-
ity in support of the escalating high data rate requirements
imposed by the unprecedented proliferation of mobile devices
[1]. Cognitive radio (CR) and non-orthogonal multiple access
(NOMA) constitute promising techniques of achieving high
SE [2]-[4]. Specifically, CR enables the secondary users (SUs)
to exploit the frequency bands of the primary users (PUs)
provided that the interference imposed on the PUs from the
SUs is below a certain level. NOMA has a higher information-
theoretic rate region than orthogonal techniques albeit, which
is achieved by increasing the receiver’s implementation com-
plexity [4]. One of the main ideas for realizing NOMA is to
exploit the power domain. Specifically, multiple users’ signals
are superimposed by using different power levels and succes-
sive interference cancellation (SIC) is installed at the receiver
for mitigating the mutual interference imposed by using non-
orthogonal resources [5]. It is envisioned that applying NOMA
in CR networks (CRNs) is capable of significantly improving
the SE and the user connectivity [6], [7].
Meanwhile, the next generation wireless communication
systems also need energy-efficient techniques due to the ever-
increasing greenhouse gas emission concerns and explosive
proliferation of power-limited devices, e.g., sensors and mo-
bile phones. Energy-efficient techniques can be divided into
two broad categories. One of the categories focuses on the
techniques that can achieve high energy efficiency (EE) [8],
[9], while the other one aims for recycling energy, where both
wireless charging as well as simultaneous wireless information
and power transfer (SWIPT) [10] fit. In this paper, we focus
on SWIPT since it can simultaneously transmit information
and achieve energy harvesting (EH). In SWIPT, the radio
frequency (RF) signals carry not only information to the users,
but also transfer energy for the energy harvesting receivers
(EHRs). Compared to the conventional EH techniques, such
as wind charging, SWIPT has an advantage in providing more
stable and controllable amount of power for energy-limited
devices. Hence, it is of significant importance to study the
application of SWIPT in NOMA CRNs that aim for supporting
massive population of battery driven power-limited devices.
However, due to the broadcast nature of NOMA as well as
CR and the dual function of RF signals [11], [12], NOMA
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2CRNs relying on SWIPT are vulnerable to eavesdropping.
Malicious EHRs may intercept the confidential information
transmitted to the PUs and the SUs [13]. Thus, it is vital
to improve the security of NOMA CRNs using SWIPT.
As an alternative to the traditional cryptographic techniques,
physical-layer security exploits the physical characteristics
(e.g., multipath fading, propagation delay, etc.) of wireless
channels to achieve secure communications [16]-[17]. It was
shown [16]-[17] that the secrecy rate of wireless communica-
tion systems directly depends on the accuracy of the channel
state information (CSI). Moreover, the secrecy rate of SUs
in CRNs is more severely limited [13], [18]-[22] since their
transmission power should be controlled in order to protect
the PUs’ quality of service. In order to improve the secrecy
rate of SUs, multiple antennas, cooperative relaying, jamming
and artificial noise (AN)-aided techniques have been applied
[18]-[22]. Moreover, the secrecy rate can be further improved
by designing an optimal resource allocation scheme [18]-[22].
Furthermore, the secure energy efficiency can be enhanced by
using AN-aided techniques and designing the optimal resource
allocation schemes [23], [24]. However, the performance gains
achieved by using these techniques are significantly influenced
by the accuracy of CSI. What’s worse, it is a challenge to
obtain accurate CSI, especially for NOMA [25], [26]. Thus, it
is important to design resource allocation schemes under the
imperfect CSI.
Numerous investigations have been conducted for improv-
ing the security of the conventional OMA systems and efforts
have been invested into conceiving secure NOMA systems
[12], [27]-[30]. However, no contributions have been devoted
to improving the security of NOMA CRNs using SWIPT.
In this paper, in order to achieve secure communications,
beamforming design problems are studied in multiple-input
single-output (MISO) NOMA CRNs using SWIPT where a
practical non-linear EH model is applied as well as different
CSI models are considered. An AN-aided cooperative scheme
is proposed for improving the security of the primary network.
By using this scheme, the secondary network imposes artificial
noise for jamming the malicious EHRs while aspiring to get a
chance to access the frequency bands of the primary network.
The related work and the motivation of our investigation are
presented as follows.
A. Related Work and Motivation
Beamforming design problems have been extensively stud-
ied both in conventional CRNs [31]-[36] and in conventional
CRNs using SWIPT [13], [22], [38]-[41]. Recently, some
efforts have also been dedicated to designing NOMA resource
allocation schemes for improving their security [12], [27]-[30].
These contributions can be summarized as follows.
Due to the broadcast nature of the conventional CRNs,
malicious SUs may intercept the confidential information
transmitted to the legitimate SUs. In order to improve the
security of CRNs, numerous secure physical-layer techniques
have been proposed by using different CSI models [31]-[36].
In [31], a robust beamforming scheme has been proposed for
MISO CRNs in the face of a bounded CSI error model. It was
shown that as anticipated the secrecy rate of the SUs can be
significantly improved by using multiple antennas techniques,
by contrast it is reduced when the CSI inaccuracy goes up.
By exploiting the relationship between multi-antenna aided
secure communications and cognitive radio communications,
the authors of [32] designed an optimal beamforming scheme
for MISO-aided CRNs. In [33], the authors extended the con-
tributions of [31] and [32] into a fading channel and the secure
throughput was maximized by optimizing both the beam-
forming vector and the transmission power. The authors of
[34] studied the robust beamforming design problem in MISO
CRNs where realistic finite-alphabet inputs are considered. A
global optimization approach was proposed for designing an
optimal beamforming scheme for maximizing the secrecy rate.
Recently, the authors of [35] and [36] studied the beamforming
design problems of secure MISO multiuser unicast CRNs and
of mutlicast CRNs, respectively. Specifically, in [35], an AN-
aided beamforming scheme was proposed. It was shown that as
expected the secrecy rate of SUs can be improved by imposing
artificial noise on malicious SUs. Cooperation between the
primary network and the secondary network was proposed in
[36] where the secrecy rate of SUs was maximized under the
max-min fairness criterion.
Since energy harvesting has not been considered in [31]-
[36], the beamforming schemes proposed in these works are
inappropriate in CRNs using SWIPT. Recently, the authors of
[13], [22], [38]-[41] studied the resource allocation problems
of various CRNs using SWIPT. In [13], a multi-objective
optimization framework was applied in MISO CRNs with
SWIPT. The beamforming scheme, the covariance matrix of
AN and energy signals were jointly optimized. It was shown
that there are several tradeoffs in CRNs using SWIPT, such as
the tradeoff between the secrecy rate of SUs and the harvested
power of EHRs. The authors of [13] only considered the
bounded CSI error model. In [22], the authors studied the
robust beamforming design problem both under the bounded
CSI error model and the probabilistic CSI error model. It was
shown that a performance gain can be obtained under the
probabilistic CSI error model compared to the bounded CSI
error model. Mohjazi et al. [37] extended the robust beam-
forming design problem into a multi-user MISO CRNs using
SWIPT. The transmission power of the cognitive base station
(CBS) was minimized by jointly optimizing the beamforming
of CBS and the power splitting factor of the energy-harvesting
SUs. In order to further improve the secrecy rate and the
harvested power of EHRs, an optimal precoding scheme was
designed for multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) aided
CRNs using SWIPT [38]. In [39], a cooperative mechanism
and a robust beamforming scheme were proposed for im-
proving the security of CRNs, where the energy signals were
exploited to jam the malicious EHRs. The authors of [40] have
studied robust resource allocation problems in MIMO-aided
CRNs using SWIPT under the probabilistic CSI error model.
The contributions of [13], [22], [38]-[40] assumed an ideal
linear EH model. However, practical power conversion circuits
have a non-linear end-to-end wireless power transfer function.
Hence, the robust resource allocation schemes proposed in
these treatises would perform difficultly in the face of a
3realistic non-linear power transfer characteristic. In [41], the
robust beamforming design problem was studied in MISO
CRNs using SWIPT, where a non-linear EH model was used.
The above-mentioned contributions were made for CRNs
and CRNs with SWIPT where OMA is applied. However,
these resource allocation schemes proposed in the above-
mentioned works are inappropriate or suboptimal in NOMA
systems since NOMA schemes are very different from OMA.
The authors of [12], [27]-[30] have studied the optimal re-
source allocation problems in NOMA systems in order to
achieve secure communications. In [12], an optimal power
allocation scheme was proposed for maximizing the secrecy
sum rate of a single-input single-output (SISO) NOMA sys-
tem, where only an eavesdropper was assumed and a constant
decoding order was applied. In [27], the authors considered a
more general scenario, where a dynamic decoding order was
considered. The sum secrecy rate was maximized by jointly
optimizing the decoding order, the transmission rates and
the power allocated to users. The secrecy rate maximization
problems of MISO NOMA systems [28], [29] and MIMO
NOMA systems [30] were investigated. It was shown that
the secrecy rate achieved by using NOMA is higher than that
achieved by using OMA, and that the secrecy rate of users can
be improved by using multiple antennas-aided techniques.
Although resource allocation problems have indeed been
conceived for NOMA systems for achieving secure communi-
cations [12], [27]-[30], resource allocation schemes proposed
in these contributions operated under the assumption that per-
fect CSI can be obtained. Moreover, these resource allocation
schemes cannot work in NOMA CRNs using SWIPT since the
interference between the primary network and the secondary
network as well as the energy harvesting requirements of
the EHRs are required to be considered. Furthermore, the
robust resource allocation schemes proposed in conventional
CRNs using SWIPT are inappropriate for NOMA CRNs using
SWIPT due to the differences between NOMA and OMA.
To the best of our knowledge, few investigations have been
conduced for improving the security of NOMA CRNs using
SWIPT. Thus, in order to achieve secure communications in
NOMA CRNs using SWIPT, beamforming design problems
are studied both under the perfect CSI model and the bounded
CSI error model. These problems are challenging but mean-
ingful. The reasons are from the following two perspectives.
On the one hand, a practical non-linear EH model is applied,
but the EH form is more complex than the linear form. On
the other hand, the mutual interference between the primary
network and the secondary network as well as the interference
among NOMA SUs have to be considered.
B. Contributions and Organization
In contrast to [12], [27]-[30], this paper studies the beam-
forming design problems of MISO-NOMA CRNs using
SWIPT, where multiple malicious EHRs exist and a practical
non-linear EH model is applied. Both the perfect CSI and the
bounded CSI error model are considered. In order to improve
the security of the primary network, an AN-aided cooperative
scheme is proposed. The main contributions are summarized
as follows:
1) The AN-aided cooperative scheme is proposed for
MISO-NOMA CRNs using SWIPT in order to improve
the security of the primary network. By using this
scheme, the CBS transmits a jamming signal to cooper-
ate with the primary base station (PBS) for improving
the security of the PUs. As a reward, the secondary
network is granted to access the frequency bands of the
primary network and provide SWIPT services both for
the SUs and for the EHRs in the secondary network.
Moreover, the covariance matrix of the jamming signals
transmitted at CBS and the beamforming of the CBS
and the PBS are jointly optimized.
2) Beamforming design problems are studied under both
the perfect CSI model and the bounded CSI error model.
In contrast to the works that only an eavesdropper
was considered in the NOMA system [12], [27]-[30],
we investigate a more general scenario, where multiple
malicious EHRs exist. The total transmission power
is minimized by jointly optimizing the transmission
beamforming vectors of both the PBS and the CBS as
well as the covariance matrix of the jamming signal
transmitted at the CBS, subject to constraints on the
secrecy rates of both the PUs and the SUs as well as
on the energy harvesting requirements of the EHRs.
A pair of algorithms are proposed for solving these
challenging non-convex problems. One of them relies on
semidefinite relaxation (SDR) while the other is based
on a carefully conceived cost function.
3) Our simulation results show that the proposed AN-
aided cooperative scheme can reduce the transmission
power required in MISO-NOMA CRNs using SWIPT.
Moreover, it is shown that the performance achieved
by NOMA is proven to be better than that obtained by
OMA, even when the CSI is imperfect. Furthermore, our
simulation results also show that the algorithm based on
the cost function outperforms the algorithm based on
using SDR.
C. Organization and Notations
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
system model is presented in Section II. Our secure beam-
forming design problems are examined under the perfect CSI
assumption in Section III. Section IV presents our secure
beamforming design problems under the bounded CSI error
model while our simulation results are presented in Section V.
Finally, the paper is concluded in Section VI.
Notations: Vectors and matrices are represented by boldface
lower case letters and boldface capital letters, respectively. The
identity matrix is denoted by I; NP,t and NS,t are the number
of antennas of the PBS and the CBS, respectively; vec(A)
denotes the vectorization of matrix A and it is obtained by
stacking its column vectors. The Hermitian (conjugate) trans-
pose, trace, and rank of a matrix A are denoted respectively by
AH, Tr(A) and Rank(A). x† represents the conjugate trans-
pose of a vector x. CM×N stands for an M -by-N dimensional
complex matrix set. A  0 (A  0) represents that A is
a Hermitian positive semidefinite (definite) matrix. HN and
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Fig. 1: The system model.
HN+ represent a N -by-N dimensional Hermitian matrix set
and a Hermitian positive semidefinite matrix set, respectively.
‖·‖ denotes the Euclidean norm of a vector. |·| represents
the absolute value of a complex scalar. x ∼ CN (u,Σ)
means that x is a random vector, which follows a complex
Gaussian distribution with mean u and covariance matrix Σ.
E[·] denotes the expectation operator. Re (a) extracts the real
part of vector a. λmax (A) is the maximum eigenvalue of A.
R+ represents the set of all nonnegative real numbers. [x]+
denotes the maximum between 0 and x.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we will describe the network model and
security metrics in the downlink MISO NOMA CRNs using
SWIPT under a practical non-linear energy harvesting model.
In [12], [27]-[30], only one eavesdropper has been consid-
ered in the designed NOMA systems and resource allocation
schemes have been proposed. In this paper, the beamforming
design problems are studied in a more general scenario,
where multiple malicious EHRs exist. The detail description
is presented in the following subsections.
A. Network Model
Our downlink MISO NOMA CR network using SWIPT is
shown in Fig. 1. In the primary network, unicast-multicast
communications are exploited since they can provide high SE
and massive connectivity. This scenario is widely encountered,
for example in Internet of Things, wireless sensor networks
and the cellular networks [35], [36]. Specifically, the PBS
sends different confidential information-bearing signals to
the PUs in the different clusters. And the primary users in
each individual multicast cluster receive the same confidential
information-bearing signal from the PBS. In the secondary
network, the NOMA is applied since it can achieve high power
transfer efficiency and SUs can perform SIC [6], [7]. In this
case, the PBS broadcasts the information to the PUs in M
clusters and simultaneously transfers energy to EHRs. In the
secondary network, the CBS provides SWIPT service to Ks
EHRs and to Ns SUs by using NOMA. Due to the constrained
size of devices, the PUs and SUs can only perform information
decoding while the EHRs can only harvest energy from the
RF signals [22], [35]. The primary network coexists with the
secondary network by using the spectrum sharing mode. The
PBS is equipped with Np,t antennas and the CBS is equipped
with Ns,t antennas. All the PUs, SUs and EHRs are equipped
with a single antenna.
Due to the broadcast natures of NOMA and the dual
function of RF signals in SWIPT, the EHR may eavesdrop
and intercept the information transmitted by the PBS and
the CBS. It is assumed that EHRs in each network can only
intercept confidential information from the same network and
the PUs in each cluster are respectively wiretapped by EHRs
in the same cluster [36]. For example, PUs in the mth cluster,
where m ∈ M and M ∆= {1, 2, · · · ,M}, are wiretapped
by the kth EHR in the mth cluster, where k ∈ M and
Km ∆= {1, 2, · · · ,Km} and Km is the number of EHRs
while Np,m is the number of PUs in the mth cluster. In
order to improve the security of both the primary network
and the secondary network, an AN-aided cooperative scheme
is applied. Using this scheme, the CBS of Fig. 1 transmits
a jamming signal to the primary network for improving the
security of the PUs. As a reward, the primary network allows
the secondary network to operate on its frequency bands. All
the channels involved are assumed to be flat fading channels.
In this paper, both the perfect CSI and imperfect CSI cases are
studied. The performance achieved under the perfect CSI can
be used as a bound in our analysis and provides meaningful
insights into the design of MISO NOMA CRNs using SWIPT.
The assumption has also been used in [11], [12], [18], [19].
B. Security Metrics
Let yp,m,i denote the signal received at the ith PU in the
mth cluster, ys,j represent the signal received at the jth SU,
ye,m,k denote the EH signal received at the kth EHR in the
mth cluster and ye,l represent the EH signal received at the lth
EHR in the secondary network, respectively, where i ∈ Np,m,
Np,m = {1, 2, · · · , Np,m}; j ∈ Ns, Ns = {1, 2, · · · , Ns} and
l ∈ Ks, Ks = {1, 2, · · · ,Ks}. These signals are respectively
expressed as
yp,m,i =h
†
p,m,i
[
M∑
m=1
(wp,msp,m + vp,m)
]
+ f†s,m,i
 Ns∑
j=1
ws,jss,j + vs
+ np,m,i, (1a)
ys,j =q
†
p,j
[
M∑
m=1
(wp,msp,m + vp,m)
]
+ h†s,j
 Ns∑
j=1
ws,jss,j + vs
+ ns,j , (1b)
5ye,m,k =g
†
e,m,k
[
M∑
m=1
(wp,msp,m + vp,m)
]
+ f†e,m,k
 Ns∑
j=1
ws,jss,j + vs
 , (1c)
ye,l =q
†
e,l
[
M∑
m=1
(wp,msp,m + vp,m)
]
+ g†e,l
 Ns∑
j=1
ws,jss,j + vs
 , (1d)
where hp,m,i ∈ CNp,t×1 and fs,m,i ∈ CNs,t×1 are the
channel vector between the PBS and the ith PU as well as
that between the CBS and the ith PU in the mth cluster,
respectively; qp,j ∈ CNp,t×1 and hs,j ∈ CNs,t×1 denote the
channel vector between the PBS and the jth SU as well as that
between the CBS and the jth SU, respectively. Furthermore,
ge,m,k ∈ CNp,t×1 and fe,m,k ∈ CNs,t×1 are the channel
vector between the PBS and the kth EHR and that between
the CBS and the jth EHR in the mth cluster, respectively;
qe,l ∈ CNp,t×1 and ge,l ∈ CNs,t×1 represent the channel
vector between the PBS and the lth EHR and that between the
CBS and the lth EHR in the secondary network, respectively.
Still regarding to (1a), sp,m ∈ C1×1 and wp,m ∈ CNp,t×1
are the confidential information-bearing signal for the PUs in
the mth cluster and the corresponding beamforming vector,
respectively. Furthermore, ss,j ∈ C1×1 and ws,j ∈ CNs,t×1
represent the confidential information-bearing signal delivered
for the jth SU and the corresponding beamforming vector,
respectively. Additionally, vp,m and vs denote the noise
vector artificially generated by the PBS and the CBS. It is
assumed that E[|sp,m|2] = 1 and E[|ss,j |2] = 1. It is also
assumed that vp,m ∼ CN (0,Σp,m) and vs ∼ CN (0,Σs),
where Σp,m and Σs are the AN covariance matrix. In (1),
np,m,i ∼ CN
(
0, σ2p,m,i
)
and ns,j ∼ CN
(
0, σ2s,j
)
respectively
denote the complex Gaussian noise at the ith PU in the mth
cluster and the lth SU.
The secrecy rate of the ith PU in the mth cluster and
the secrecy rate of the jth SU, denoted by Rp,m,i and Rs,j ,
respectively, can be expressed as
Rp,m,i =
[
log
(
Γp,m,i
Γp,m,i − Tr (Wp,mHp,m,i)
)
− max
k∈Km
log
(
Γe,m,k + σ
2
e,m,k
Γe,m,k − Tr (Wp,mGe,m,k) + σ2e,m,k
)]+
,
(2a)
Rs,j

=
[
log2
(
Γs,j
Γs,j−Tr(Ws,jHs,j)
)
−max
l∈L
log2
(
Λe,l,j
Λe,l,j−Tr(Ws,jGe,l)
)]+
, if j = Ns,
=
[
min
z∈{j,j+1,Ns}
log2
(
Λs,j,z
Λs,j,z−Tr(Ws,jHs,z)
)
−max
l∈L
log2
(
Λs,l,j
Λs,l,j−Tr(Ws,jGe,l)
)]+
, otherwise.
(2b)
where Wp,m = wp,mw†p,m; Ws,j = ws,jw
†
s,j ; Hp,m,i =
hp,m,ih
†
p,m,i; Fs,m,i = fs,m,if
†
s,m,i; Qp,j = qp,jq
†
p,j ; Hs,j =
hs,jh
†
s,j ; Ge,m,k = ge,m,kg
†
e,m,k; Fe,m,k = fe,m,kf
†
e,m,k;
Qe,l = qe,lq
†
e,l and Ge,l = ge,lg
†
e,l. The expressions of
Γp,m,i, Γe,m,k, Γs,j , Λe,l,j , Λs,j,z and Λs,l,j are given in
(3). Without loss of generality, it is assumed that ‖h1‖ ≤
‖h2‖ ≤ · · · ≤ ‖hNs‖. Similar to [12], [27]-[28], it is
assumed furthermore that the EHR in the secondary network
has decoded SU j’s message before it decodes the SU i’s
message, j < i. This over-estimates the interception capability
of EHRs and results in the worst-case secrecy rate of the SUs.
This conservative assumption was also used in [12], [27]-[28].
Γp,m,i = Tr
{[
M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m)
]
Hp,m,i
+
 Ns∑
j=1
Ws,j + Σs
Fs,m,i
+ σ2p,m,i, (3a)
Γe,m,k = Tr
{[
M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m)
]
Ge,m,k
+
 Ns∑
j=1
Ws,j + Σs
Fe,m,k
 , (3b)
Γs,j = Tr
{[
M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m)
]
Qp,j
+ (Ws,j + Σs) Hs,j}+ σ2s,j , (3c)
Λe,l,j = Tr
[[
M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m)
]
Qe,l
+ (Ws,j + Σs) Ge,l] + σ
2
e,l, (3d)
Λs,j,z = Tr
{[
M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m)
]
Hp,z
+
 Ns∑
u=j
Ws,u + Σs
Hs,z
+ σ2s,z, (3e)
Λs,l,j = Tr
{[
M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m)
]
Qe,l
+
 Ns∑
υ=j
Ws,υ + Σs
Ge,l
+ σ2e,l. (3f)
C. Non-linear Energy Harvesting Model
In this paper, a practical non-linear EH model is adopted.
According to [41]-[43], the harvesting power of EHRs, de-
noted by ΦE,A, can be formulated as:
Φe,A =
(
ψe,A − Pmaxe,A Ψe,A
1−Ψe,A
)
, (4a)
ψe,A =
Pmaxe,A
1 + exp [−ae,A (Γe,A − be,A)] , (4b)
Ψe,A =
1
1 + exp (ae,Abe,A)
, (4c)
6where A is the set of EHRs in the primary network and the sec-
ondary network, namely, A = A1 ∪ A2, and A1 = ∪
m∈M
Km,
m ∈ M, A2 = Ks; ae,A and be,A represent parameters
that reflect the circuit specifications, such as the resistance,
the capacitance and diode turn-on voltage [42]. Furthermore,
Pmaxe,A is the maximum harvested power of EHRs when the EH
circuit is saturated. In (4b), Γe,A is the RF power received at
EHRs. Furthermore, Γe,A = Γe,m,k when the EHRs are in
the primary network and Γe,A = Λs,l,1−σ2e,l when the EHRs
are in the secondary network. Note that the noise power is
ignored, since it is small compared to the RF signal power
[41]-[43].
III. AN-AIDED BEAMFORMING DESIGN UNDER PERFECT
CSI
In this section, an AN-aided beamforming design problem
is formulated in MISO NOMA CRNs using SWIPT under the
perfect CSI. The CSI between the PBS and PUs as well as the
CSI between the CBS and the SUs can be obtained through the
feedback from the corresponding transmitters and the receivers
[11], [12], [18], [19]. The CSI between the two networks
can be obtained with the cooperation between the primary
network and the secondary network [18], [33], [34]. The total
transmission power is minimized subject to the constraints
on both the secrecy rates of PUs and SUs as well as on
the harvested power of EHRs in both the primary and the
secondary networks. In order to solve the challenging non-
convex problem, again, a pair of suboptimal algorithms are
proposed. One is based on SDR and the other is based on a
cost function.
A. AN-aided Beamforming Design Problem
In order to minimize the sum of the transmission power
of the PBS and CBS, the beamforming weights and the AN
covariance of the PBS and the CBS are jointly optimized under
constraints of the secrecy rate of PUs as well as SUs and under
the EH requirements of the EHRs. The power minimization
problem is formulated as follows:
P1 : min
Wp,m,Σp,m
Ws,j ,Σs
Tr
 M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m) +
Ns∑
j=1
Ws,j + Σs

(5a)
s.t.
C1 : Rp,m,i ≥ γp,m,i, i ∈ Np,m,m ∈M, (5b)
C2 : Rs,j ≥ γs,j , j ∈ Ns, (5c)
C3 : Φe,A1 ≥ ζe,A1 , k ∈ Km,m ∈M, (5d)
C4 : Φe,A2 ≥ ζe,A2 , l ∈ Ks, (5e)
C5 : Rank (Wp,m) = 1,Rank (Ws,j) = 1 (5f)
C6 : Wp,m  0,Ws,j  0. (5g)
In (5), γp,m,i and γs,j are the minimum secrecy rate re-
quirements of the ith PU in the mth cluster and of the
jth SU; ζe,A1 and ζe,A2 are the minimum EH requirements
of EHRs in the primary and the secondary network. The
constraints C1 and C2 are imposed to guarantee the secrecy
rates of the PUs and SUs, respectively; the constraints C3 and
C4 are the constraints that can satisfy the harvested power
requirements of the EHRs in both the primary and secondary
networks; and the constraint C5 is the rank-one constraint
required for obtaining rank-one beamforming. Note that the
optimization objective of P1 can be identified as the weight
objective of a multiple-objective optimization problem that has
two optimization objectives (e.g., the transmission power of
the PBS and the CBS) with the same weight. Due to the
constraints C1, C2 and C5, P1 is non-convex and difficult
to solve. In order to solve this problem, a pair of suboptimal
schemes are proposed as follows.
B. Suboptimal Solution Based on SDR
To address the constraint C1, an auxiliary variable τm, m ∈
M, is introduced. Then, the constraint C1 can be equivalently
expressed as
log
{
Γp,m,i
[Γp,m,i − Tr (Wp,mHp,m,i)] τm
}
≥ γp,m,i, (6a)
log
 Γe,m,k + σ2E,m,k[Γe,m,k − Tr (Wp,mGe,m,k) + σ2e,m,k] τm
 ≤ 1,
(6b)
where k ∈ Km and m ∈ M. Using successive convex
approximation (SCA), the constraints given by (6a) and (6b)
can be approximated as (7) and (8)
exp (αp,m,i + βm − λp,m,i) ≤ 2−γp,m,i , (7a)
Γp,m,i − Tr (Wp,mHp,m,i)
≤ exp (α˜p,m,i) (αp,m,i − α˜p,m,i + 1) , (7b)
τm ≤ exp
(
β˜m
)(
βm − β˜m + 1
)
, (7c)
Γp,m,i ≥ exp (λp,m,i) , (7d)
exp (µe,m,k − ρe,m,k − δm) ≤ 1, (8a)
Γe,m,k + σ
2
e,m,k
≤ exp (µ˜e,m,k) (µe,m,k − µ˜e,m,k + 1) , (8b)
Γe,m,k − Tr (Wp,mGe,m,k) + σ2e,m,k ≥ exp (ρe,m,k) , (8c)
τm ≥ exp (δm) , (8d)
where αp,m,i, βm, λp,m,i, µe,m,k, ρe,m,k, and δm are auxiliary
variables. Furthermore, α˜p,m,i, β˜m and µ˜e,m,k are approximate
values, and they are equal to αp,m,i, βm and µe,m,k, respec-
tively, when the constraints are tight. Similarly, the constraint
C2 can be approximated as (9) and (10). When j = Ns, the
7secrecy rate constraint of the Nsth SU can be formulated as
exp (αs,Ns + βs,Ns − λs,Ns) ≤ 2−γs,Ns , (9a)
Γs,Ns − Tr (Ws,NsHS,Ns)
≤ exp (α˜s,Ns) (αs,Ns − α˜s,Ns + 1) , (9b)
τs,Ns ≤ exp
(
β˜s,Ns
)(
βs,Ns − β˜s,Ns + 1
)
, (9c)
Γs,Ns ≥ exp (λs,Ns) , (9d)
exp (µe,l − ρs,l − ωs,Ns) ≤ 1, l ∈ Ks, (9e)
Λe,l,Ns ≤ exp (µ˜e,l) (µE,l − µ˜e,l + 1) , (9f)
Λe,l,Ns − Tr (Ws,NsGe,l) ≥ exp (ρs,l) , (9g)
τs,Ns ≥ exp (ωs,Ns) , (9h)
where αs,Ns , βs,Ns , λs,Ns , µe,l, ρs,l, and ωs,Ns are auxiliary
variables. Furthermore, α˜s,Ns , β˜s,Ns and µ˜e,l are approximate
values, and they are equal to αs,Ns , βs,Ns and µe,l, respec-
tively, when the constraints are tight. When j = 1, 2, · · · , Ns−
1, the secrecy rate constraint of the jth SU can be formulated
as
κj − ωj2γs,j ≥ 0, (10a)
exp (αs,j,z + ξs,j − λs,j,z) ≤ 1, z ∈ {j, j + 1, Ns} , (10b)
Λs,j,z − Tr (Ws,jHs,z)
≤ exp (α˜s,j,z) (αs,j,z − α˜s,j,z + 1) , (10c)
κj ≤ exp
(
ξ˜s,j
)(
ξs,j − ξ˜s,j + 1
)
, (10d)
Λs,j,z ≥ exp (λs,j,z) , (10e)
exp (µe,l,j − ρs,l,j − τs,j) ≤ 1, (10f)
Λs,l,j ≤ exp (µ˜e,l,j) (µe,l,j − µ˜E,l,j + 1) , (10g)
Λs,l,j − Tr (Ws,jGe,l) ≥ exp (ρs,l,j) , (10h)
ωj ≥ exp (τs,j) , (10i)
where κj , ωj , αs,j,z , ξs,j , λs,j,z , µe,l,j , ρs,l,j and τs,j de-
note auxiliary variables. Furthermore, α˜s,j,z , ξ˜s,j and µ˜e,l,j
are approximate values and equal to αs,j,z , ξs,j and µe,l,j ,
respectively, when the constraints are tight. Constraints C3
and C4 can be equivalently expressed as
Γe,A ≥ be,A − 1
ae,A
ln
{
Pmaxe,A
ζe,A (1−Ψe,A) + Pmaxe,A Ψe,A
− 1
}
.
(11)
Based on (7) and (11), using SDR, P1 can be solved by
iteratively solving P2, given as
P2 : min
Ξ
Tr
 M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m) +
Ns∑
j=1
Ws,j + Σs

(12a)
s.t. C6, (7)− (11) , (12b)
where Ξ is the set including all optimization variables and
auxiliary variables. P2 is convex and can be efficiently solved
by using the software CVX [22]. Algorithm 1 calculates the
solution of P1. The details of Algorithm 1 are provided in
Table 1, where Pnopt denotes the minimum total transmission
power at the nth iteration.
TABLE I: The SCA-based algorithm
Algorithm 1: The SCA-based algorithm for P1
1: Setting:
γp,m,i, γs,j Υm,i, ζe,A1 , ζe,A1 , i ∈ Np,m, k ∈ Km, m ∈M
l ∈ Ks and the tolerance error $;
2: Initialization:
The iterative number n = 1, α˜np,m,i, β˜
n
m, µ˜
n
e,m,k , α˜
n
s,Ns
, β˜ns,Ns ,
µ˜ne,l, α˜
n
s,j,z , ξ˜
n
s,j and µ˜
n
e,l,j and P
n
opt;
3: Repeat:
solve P2 by using CVX for the given approximate values;
obtain α˜n+1p,m,i, β˜
n+1
m , µ˜
n+1
e,m,k , α˜
n+1
s,Ns
, β˜n+1s,Ns , µ˜
n+1
e,l ,
α˜n+1s,j,z , ξ˜
n+1
s,j and µ˜
n+1
e,l,j and P
n+1
opt ;
if Rank (Wp,m) = 1 and Rank (Ws,j) = 1
Obtain optimal Wp,m and Ws,j ;
else
Obtain suboptimal Wp,m and Ws,j ;
end
update the iterative number n = n+ 1;
calculate the total transmit power Pnopt;
if
∣∣∣Pnopt − P (n−1)opt ∣∣∣ ≤ $
break;
end;
4: Obtain resource allocation:
Wp,m, Ws,j , Σp,m and Σs.
Algorithm 1 does not guarantee that the optimal beam-
forming weights wp,m, ws,j can be obtained. If Wp,m and
Ws,j are of rank-one, the optimal beamforming scheme can
be obtained by the eigenvalue decomposition and the obtained
eigenvectors are optimal beamforming. If Wp,m and Ws,j are
not of rank-one, the suboptimal beamforming vectors can be
obtained by using the Gaussian randomization procedure [22].
C. Suboptimal Solution Based on Cost Function
Since Wp,m and Ws,j are semi-positive definite, the
ranks of Wp,m and Ws,j are equal to 1 when their
maximum eigenvalues are equal to its trace, namely,
when we have Rank (Wp,m) = λmax (Wp,m) and
Rank (Ws,j) = λmax (Ws,j); Otherwise, we have
Rank (Wp,m) > λmax (Wp,m) and Rank (Ws,j) >
λmax (Ws,j). Thus, the rank-one constraint can be equivalent
to
M∑
m=1
[Tr (Wp,m)− λmax (Wp,m)]+
Ns∑
j=1
[Tr (Ws,j)− λmax
(Ws,j)] ≤ 0. From this insight, we can see that the smaller
M∑
m=1
[Tr (Wp,m)− λmax
(Wp,m)] +
Ns∑
j=1
[Tr (Ws,j) −λmax (Ws,j)] is, the more likely
that the rank-one constraints can be satisfied. By exploiting a
8cost function based approach, P2 is reformulated into P3 as
P3 : min
Ξ
Tr
 M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m) +
Ns∑
j=1
Ws,j + Σs

+ `
{
M∑
m=1
[Tr (Wp,m)− λmax (Wp,m)]
+
Ns∑
j=1
[Tr (Ws,j)− λmax (Ws,j)]
 (13a)
s.t. (12b) , (13b)
where ` > 0 is a cost factor. It may be readily shown that the
minimum value
M∑
m=1
[Tr (Wp,m)− λmax (Wp,m)]
+
Ns∑
j=1
[Tr (Ws,j)− λmax (Ws,j)] can be obtained by using
a large ` value. Since λmax (Wp,m) and λmax (Ws,j) are
convex, P3 is non-convex. The following lemma is applied
to solve the non-convex problem P3.
Lemma 1 [45]: Let λmax (X) and λmax (Y) denote the
maximum eigenvalue of X and Y, respectively. If X and
Y are semi-positive definite, then we have λmax (X) −
λmax (Y) ≥ y†max (X−Y) ymax, where ymax is the eigen-
vector related to the maximum eigenvalue of Y.
Using Lemma 1, P3 can be approximated as P4.
P4 : min
Ξ
f
(
Wn+1p,m ,W
n+1
s,j
)
(14a)
s.t. (12b) , (14b)
where n is the iteration index and f
(
Wn+1p,m ,W
n+1
s,j
)
is given
by
f
(
Wn+1p,m ,W
n+1
s,j
)
= Tr
 M∑
m=1
(
Wn+1p,m + Σp,m
)
+
Ns∑
j=1
Wn+1s,j + Σs

+ `
{
M∑
m=1
[
Tr
(
Wn+1p,m
)− λmax (Wnp,m)
−(wnp,m)† (Wn+1p,m −Wnp,m)wnp,m]
+
Ns∑
j=1
[
Tr
(
Wn+1s,j
)− λmax (Wns,j)
−(wns,j)† (Wn+1s,j −Wns,j)wns,j]} , (15)
where wnp,m and w
n
s,j are the eigenvectors related to the
maximum eigenvalue of Wnp,m and W
n
s,j , respectively. It is
seen that P4 is convex and can be solved by using CVX. By
solving P4, the iterative Algorithm 2 can be designed to solve
P1. The details of Algorithm 2 are presented in Table 2.
IV. AN-AIDED BEAMFORMING DESIGN UNDER
IMPERFECT CSI
In this section, the AN-aided beamforming design problem
is studied in a more practical MISO NOMA CRN using
SWIPT, where the CSI between the CBS and the EHRs in the
TABLE II: The cost function-based algorithm
Algorithm 2: The cost function-based algorithm for P1
1: Setting:
γp,m,i, γs,j Υm,i, ζe,A1 , ζe,A1 , i ∈ Np,m, k ∈ Km, m ∈M
l ∈ Ks and the tolerance error $;
2: Initialization:
The iterative number n = 1, α˜np,m,i, β˜
n
m, µ˜
n
e,m,k , α˜
n
s,Ns
, β˜ns,Ns ,
Wnp,m and W
n
s,j ;
3: Repeat:
solve P4 by using CVX for the given approximate values;
obtain α˜n+1p,m,i, β˜
n+1
m , µ˜
n+1
e,m,k , α˜
n+1
s,Ns
, β˜n+1s,Ns , µ˜
n+1
e,l ,
W
(n+1)
p,m and W
(n+1)
s,j ;
set ` = 2`;
end if
update the iterative number n = n+ 1;
calculate the total transmit power Pnopt;
if Tr
(
Wn+1p,m
)
− λmax
(
Wnp,m
) ≤ $
and Tr
(
Wn+1s,j
)
− λmax
(
Wns,j
)
≤ $
break;
end;
4: Obtain resource allocation:
wnp,m, w
n
s,j , Σp,m and Σs.
primary network and the CSI between the PBS and the EHRs
in the secondary network are imperfect due to the limited
cooperation between the primary and the secondary network.
Since the bounded CSI error can be readily applied to model
the estimating errors [13], [25], [35]-[38], it is opted for this
paper. Moreover, the CSI between the PBS and SUs and the
CSI between the CBS and the PBS can be obtained through the
cooperation between the primary network and the secondary
network, or can be obtained from a third party such as a
manager center [8]. Furthermore, the CSI of the secondary link
can be obtained by estimating it at the CBS and then sending it
back to the CBS through a feedback link, which assumed error-
free in this simplified model [22], [44]. Under the bounded
error model, a robust AN-aided beamforming design problem
is formulated. The non-convex problem is solved by using
SCA and the S-Procedure [45].
A. Robust AN-aided Beamforming Design Problem Formula-
tion
Under the bounded error model, the channel vector qe,l can
be formulated as
qe,l = qe,l + ∆qe,l, l ∈ Ks, (16a)
Ψe,l
∆
=
{
∆qe,l ∈ CNp,t×1 : ∆q†e,l∆qe,l ≤ £2e,l
}
, (16b)
while the channel vector fe,m,k can be expressed as
fe,m,k = fe,m,k + ∆fe,m,k,m ∈M,k ∈ Km, (17a)
Ψe,m,k
∆
=
{
∆fe,m,k ∈ CNs,t×1 : ∆f†e,m,k∆fe,m,k ≤ £2e,m,k
}
,
(17b)
where qe,l and fe,m,k are the estimates of qe,l and fe,m,k, re-
spectively; Ψe,l and Ψe,m,k represent the uncertainty regions
of the channel vectors qe,l and fe,m,k, respectively; ∆qe,l
and ∆fe,m,k denote the channel estimation errors of qe,l and
9fe,m,k; £e,l and £e,m,k are the radii of the uncertainty regions
Ψe,l and Ψe,m,k, respectively.
Based on the bounded error models for qe,l and fe,m,k,
the power minimization problem subject to the constraints on
the secrecy rates of the PUs and the SUs as well as on the
harvested power requirements of EHRs in both the primary
and secondary networks can be formulated as P5, given as
min
Wp,m,Σp,m
Ws,j ,Σs
Tr
 M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m) +
Ns∑
j=1
Ws,j + Σs

(18a)
s.t.
C6 : Rp,m,i ≥ γp,m,i, i ∈ Np,m,m ∈M,∀∆fe,m,k ∈ Ψe,m,k,
(18b)
C7 : Rs,j ≥ γs,j , j ∈ Ns,∀∆qe,l ∈ Ψe,l, (18c)
C8 : Φe,A1 ≥ ζe,A1 , k ∈ Km,m ∈M,∀∆fe,m,k ∈ Ψe,m,k,
(18d)
C9 : Φe,A2 ≥ ζe,A2 , l ∈ Ks,∀∆qe,l ∈ Ψe,l, (18e)
C10 : Rank (Wp,m) = 1,Rank (Ws,j) = 1 (18f)
C11 : Wp,m  0,Ws,j  0. (18g)
The problem P5 is more challenging to solve due to the infinite
inequality constraints imposed by the uncertain regions, Ψe,l
and Ψe,m,k and owing to the non-convex constraints C6- C10.
B. Suboptimal Solution Based on Cost Function
In order to make P5 tractable, the S-Procedure of [45] is
applied.
Lemma 2 (S-Procedure) [45]: Let fi (z) = z†Aiz +
2Re
{
b†iz
}
+ ci, i ∈ {1, 2}, where z ∈ CN×1, Ai ∈ HN ,
bi ∈ CN×1 and ci ∈ R. Then, the expression f1 (z) ≤ 0 ⇒
f2 (z) ≤ 0 holds if and only if there exists a ς ≥ 0 such that
we have:
ς
[
A1 b1
b†1 c1
]
−
[
A2 b2
b†2 c2
]
 0, (19)
provided that there exists a vector ẑ so that we have fi (ẑ) < 0.
Using Lemma 2 and SCA, the constraint C6 of P5 can be
approximated as (20) at the top of the next page. In (20),
λe,m,k ≥ 0 and ue,m,k ≥ 0 are slack variables while θe,m,k
and oe,m,k are auxiliary variables. Similarly, the constraint C7
is approximated as follows.
When j = Ns, one has (21) at the top of the next page.
and when j = 1, 2, · · · , Ns − 1, the secrecy rate constraint
of the jth SU can be approximated as (22) at the top of the
next page. where ωe,l ≥ 0, κe,l ≥ 0, τ ≥ 0 and ηe,l ≥ 0 are
slack variables. The constraints C8 and C9 can be equivalently
expressed as (23) at the top of the next two pages. In (23),
χe,m,k ≥ 0 and ϕe,l ≥ 0 are slack variables. By using (20)-
(23), P5 can be solved by iteratively solving P6, given as
P6 : min
Ξ1
f
(
Wn+1p,m ,W
n+1
s,j
)
(24a)
s.t. C11, (20)− (23) , (24b)
where f
(
Wn+1p,m ,W
n+1
s,j
)
is given by (15), and Ξ1 denotes the
set including all optimization variables, auxiliary variables and
slack variables. Since P6 is convex, it can be readily solved by
using CVX. Similar to P1, Algorithm 2 can be used to solve
P5. The procedure is the same and it is omitted due to space
limitation.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, simulation results are provided for com-
paring the performance obtained by using NOMA to that
achieved by using OMA. Simulation results are also presented
to evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithms. The
time division multiple access (TDMA) scheme is selected as
the OMA scheme for comparison. The simulation settings
are based on those used in [42] and [43]. All the channels
involved are assumed to be Rayleigh flat fading. The number
of channel realizations is 104. The variance of noise at all
users and EHRs is −120 dBm. The channel distributions are
set as: hp,m,i ∼ CN (0, 2I), fs,m,i ∼ CN (0, 0.5I), qp,j ∼
CN (0, 0.5I), hs,j ∼ CN (0, 2I), ge,m,k ∼ CN (0, 1.5I),
fe,m,k ∼ CN (0, 0.5I), qe,l ∼ CN (0, 0.5I) and ge,l ∼
CN (0, 1.5I). The detailed simulation settings are given in
Table III.
TABLE III: Simulation Parameters
Parameters Notation Typical Values
Numbers of antennas of the PBS Np,t 10
Numbers of antennas of the CBS Ns,t 5
Numbers of the clusters M 2
Numbers of PUs Np,m 2
Numbers of SUs Ns 3
The maximum harvested power Pmaxe,A 24 mW
Circuit parameter ae,A 1500
Circuit parameter be,A 0.0022
The minimum secrecy rate of PUs γp,m,i 2 bits/s/Hz
The minimum secrecy rate of SUs γs,j 1 bits/s/Hz
The minimum EH of EHRs in set A1 ζe,A1 15 mW
The minimum EH of EHRs in set A2 ζe,A2 5 mW
The tolerance error $ 10−4
The radiuses of the uncertainty regions £e,l 10−2
£e,m,k 10
−2
Fig. 2 shows the minimum transmission power versus the
number of EHRs in the secondary network under the perfect
CSI scenario. Since Algorithm 2 is capable of obtaining
rank-one solutions, it is used to obtain the results of CRNs
using OMA, OMA with cooperation and NOMA without
cooperation. Fig. 2 also compares the performance obtained
by using Algorithm 1 to that achieved by using Algorithm
2. It is seen that the minimum transmission power consumed
without the cooperative jamming scheme is higher than that
consumed with our proposed cooperative jamming scheme.
The reason is that our proposed cooperative jamming scheme
is beneficial for the PUs to achieve a high secrecy rate and
that a low transmission power is required for guaranteeing
the secrecy rate of the PUs. This indicates that our proposed
cooperative jamming scheme is eventually helpful for secure
communications. It is also seen that the transmission power
consumed by using NOMA is lower than that consumed by
using TDMA both with and without cooperation between the
primary network and the secondary network. This can be
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
λe,m,kI−
(
Ns∑
j=1
Ws,j + Σs
)
−
(
Ns∑
j=1
Ws,j + Σs
)
fe,m,k
−f†e,m,k
(
Ns∑
j=1
Ws,j + Σs
)
θe,m,k − f†e,m,k
(
Ns∑
j=1
Ws,j + Σs
)
fe,m,k − λe,m,k£2e,m,k
  0, (20a)

ue,m,kI +
(
Ns∑
j=1
Ws,j + Σs
) (
Ns∑
j=1
Ws,j + Σs
)
fe,m,k
f
†
e,m,k
(
Ns∑
j=1
Ws,j + Σs
)
f
†
e,m,k
(
Ns∑
j=1
Ws,j + Σs
)
fe,m,k − λe,m,k£2e,m,k − oE,m,k
  0, (20b)
(7) , (8a) and (8d) . (20c)
 ωe,lI−
M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m) −
M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m)qe,l
−q†e,l
M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m) −Λe,l − q†e,l
M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m) qe,l − ωe,l£2e,l
  0, (21a)
 κe,lI +
M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m)
M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m)qe,l
q†e,l
M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m) Λ˜e,l + q
†
e,l
M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m) qe,l − κe,l£2e,l
  0, (21b)
Λe,l = Tr [(Ws,Ns + Σs) Ge,l] + σ
2
e,l − exp (µ˜e,l) (µe,l − µ˜e,l + 1) , (21c)
Λ˜e,l = Tr (ΣsGe,l) + σ2e,l − exp (ρs,l) , (21d)
(9a)− (9d) , (9e) and (9h) , (21e)
 τe,lI−
M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m) −
M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m)qe,l
−q†e,l
M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m) −Λs,l,j − q†e,l
M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m) qe,l − τe,l£2e,l
  0, (22a)
 ηe,lI +
M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m)
M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m)qe,l
q†e,l
M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m) Λs,l,j + q
†
e,l
M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m) qe,l − ηe,l£2e,l
  0, (22b)
Λs,l,j = Tr

 Ns∑
υ=j
Ws,υ + Σs
Ge,l
+ σ2e,l − exp (µ˜e,l,j) (µe,l,j − µ˜e,l,j + 1) , (22c)
Λ˜s,l,j = Tr
 Ns∑
υ=j+1
Ws,υ + Σs
Ge,l
+ σ2e,l − exp (ρs,l,j) , (22d)
(10a)− (10f) , and (10i) , (22e)
explained by the fact that NOMA provides a higher secrecy
rate for SUs than TDMA [12], [27]. Thus, the transmission
power required for guaranteeing the secrecy rate of SUs can
be decreased. Moreover, it is interesting to note that the
transmission power achieved by using Algorithm 1 is higher
than that obtained by using Algorithm 2. It indicates that
Algorithm 2 outperforms Algorithm 1 in terms of transmission
power minimization. The reason is that Algorithm 2 can obtain
rank-one solutions, while Algorithm 1 cannot achieve rank-one
solutions.
Table 3 is given to show the number of rank-one solutions
achieved by using Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 under perfect
CSI. The results are obtained for 1000 channel realizations.
It is seen from Table 3 that Algorithm 2 can provide rank-
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
χe,m,kI +
(
Ns∑
j=1
Ws,j + Σs
) (
Ns∑
j=1
Ws,j + Σs
)
fe,m,k
f
†
e,m,k
(
Ns∑
j=1
Ws,j + Σs
)
Γe,m,k + f
†
e,m,k
(
Ns∑
j=1
Ws,j + Σs
)
fE,m,k − χe,m,k£2e,m,k
  0, (23a)
 ϕe,lI +
M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m)
M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m)qe,l
q†e,l
M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m) Γe,l + q
†
e,l
M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m) qe,l − φe,l£2E,l
  0, (23b)
Γe,m,k = Tr
{[
M∑
m=1
(Wp,m + Σp,m)
]
Ge,m,k
}
− be,m,km
+
1
ae,m,k
ln
{
Pmaxe,m,k
ψe,m,k (1−Ψe,m,k) + Pmaxe,m,kΨE,m,k
− 1
}
, (23c)
Γe,l = Tr

 Ns∑
j=1
Ws,j + Σs
GE,l
− be,l+ 1ae,l ln
{
Pmaxe,l
ψe,l (1−Ψe,l) + Pmaxe,l Ψe,l
− 1
}
. (23d)
1 2 3 4 5
−5
0
5
10
15
20
25
The number of EHRs in the secondary network
Th
e 
m
in
im
um
 tr
an
sm
is
si
on
 p
ow
er
 (d
Bm
)
 
 
OMA, non−cooperative,Algorithm 2 
NOMA, non−cooperative, Algorithm 2
OMA, cooperative,Algorithm 2
NOMA, cooperative, Algorithm 1
NOMA, cooperative, Algorithm 2
Fig. 2: The minimum transmission power versus the number of
EHRs in the secondary network under the perfect CSI scenario.
TABLE IV: Comparison of the number of rank-one solutions
achieved by Algorithms 1 and 2`````````Algorithm
(Ks) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Algorithm 1 0 0 0 0 0
Algorithm 2 259 207 248 301 196
one solutions, while Algorithm 1 cannot. The reason is that
a cost function related to rank-one solutions is applied in
Algorithm 2. When rank-one solutions are achieved, the op-
timal beamforming vectors can be obtained for the CBS and
PBS; otherwise, the optimal beamforming vectors cannot be
obtained. This is the reason why Algorithm 2 performs better
than Algorithm 1.
Fig. 3 is provided for further verifying the efficiency of
1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
−2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
The minimum secrecy rate of PUs (Bits/s/Hz)
Th
e 
m
in
im
um
 tr
an
sm
is
si
on
 p
ow
er
 (d
Bm
)
 
 
OMA, non−cooperative, Algorithm 2
NOMA, non−cooperative, Algorithm 2
OMA, cooperative, Algorithm 2
NOMA, cooperative, Algorithm 1
NOMA, cooperative, Algorithm 2
Fig. 3: The minimum transmission power versus the secrecy
rate of PUs under perfect CSI scenario.
the proposed cooperative jamming scheme. The number of
EHRs in the secondary network is 2. It is observed that
the transmission power increases with the secrecy rate of
PUs. It can be readily explained by the fact that a high
transmission power is required for guaranteeing the increased
secrecy rate requirement of PUs. As shown in Fig. 3, the
minimum transmission power required when the proposed
cooperative jamming scheme is applied is lower than that
in the absence of cooperation between the primary and the
secondary network. This phenomenon further demonstrates
the efficiency of our proposed cooperative jamming scheme
for achieving secure communications. It is also seen from
Fig. 3 that NOMA outperforms TDMA and that Algorithm
2 performs better than Algorithm 1 in terms of the required
transmission power.
Fig. 4 shows the minimum transmission power versus the
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Fig. 5: The empirical CDF of the minimum transmission power
of the CBS for both perfect and imperfect CSI scenarios.
number of iterations required by using Algorithm 1 and
Algorithm 2. The number of EHRs in the secondary network is
set to 2 or 3. It is seen from Fig. 4 that both Algorithm 1 and
Algorithm 2 require only a few iterations to converge. This
confirms the efficiency of our proposed algorithms. It is also
seen that the number of iterations required by Algorithm 2 is
larger than that required by Algorithm 1. The reason is that the
complexity of Algorithm 2 is higher than that of Algorithm
1. From Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, it is seen that there is a tradeoff
between the complexity of algorithms and the transmission
power obtained by using these algorithms.
Fig. 5 shows the empirical cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of the minimum transmission power under the perfect
CSI and the bounded CSI error model. The number of EHRs
in the secondary network is 2. It is seen from Fig. 5 that the
transmission power consumed under the bounded CSI error
model is higher than that consumed under the perfect CSI, for
both Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2. The reason is that a higher
transmission power is required for guaranteeing the secrecy
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Fig. 6: The minimum transmission power versus the minimum
harvested power requirement of EHRs in the secondary net-
work for both perfect and imperfect CSI scenarios.
rates of the PUs and the SUs, when the CSI is imperfect. It is
also seen that Algorithm 2 is superior to Algorithm 1 in terms
of the transmission power minimization, even when the CSI
is imperfect.
Fig. 6 shows the minimum transmission power versus the
minimum harvested power requirement of EHRs in the sec-
ondary network for both perfect and imperfect CSI scenarios.
The number of EHRs in the secondary network is set to 3.
The simulation results are obtained by Algorithm 2. It is seen
that the transmission power consumed by using TDMA is
higher than that consumed by using NOMA, for both perfect
and imperfect CSI scenarios. The reason is that the secrecy
rate of SUs achieved by using NOMA can be higher than
that obtained by using TDMA [12]. A lower transmission
power is required to grantee the secrecy rate of SUs. It is
also seen that the imperfect CSI has a significant effect on the
minimum transmission power. Moreover, as shown in Fig. 6,
the minimum transmission power increases with the harvested
power of EHRs in the secondary network. It can be readily
explained by the fact that a higher transmission power is
required to satisfy the increased harvesting power of EHRs
in the secondary network.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Secure communication was studied for MISO NOMA CRNs
using SWIPT, where a practical non-linear EH model was
applied. To enhance the security of the primary network, an
artificial-noise-aided cooperative jamming scheme was pro-
posed. The transmission beamforming vectors and AN-aided
covariance matrix were jointly optimized to minimize the
total transmission power of the network, while the secrecy
rates of both PUs and SUs as well as the EH requirement
of EHRs were satisfied. The beamforming design problems
were investigated under both the perfect CSI and the bounded
CSI error model. A pair of algorithms were proposed to solve
these challenging non-convex problems. It was shown that
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the performance achieved by using NOMA is better than that
obtained by using OMA. Simulation results also show that
the algorithm based on the cost function is superior to the
algorithm based on SDR. Moreover, our proposed cooperative
jamming scheme is efficient to improve the security of MISO
NOMA CRNs using SWIPT.
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